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TRUTH, MEANING, AND CIRCULARITY
ABSTRACT. It is often argued that the combination of deﬂationism about
truth and the truth-conditional theory of meaning is impossible for reasons of
circularity. I distinguish, and reject, two strains of circularity argument.
Arguments of the ﬁrst strain hold that the combination has a circular account
of the order in which one comes to know the meaning of a sentence and comes
to know its truth condition. I show that these arguments fail to identify any
circularity. Arguments of the second strain hold that the combination has a
circular explanation of the ideas or concepts of meaning and truth. I show
that these arguments identify a genuine, but acceptable, circularity.
1. INTRODUCTION
For almost forty years there was general agreement with
Dummett’s (1959) thesis that the deﬂationary view of truth
cannot successfully be combined with the truth-conditional
theory of meaning. While the consensus was disrupted with
the dissent of Lance (1997), Williams (1999), and Ko¨lbel
(2001, 2002), proponents of the thesis still nourish a small
family of arguments in its favor.1 My topic is one remarkably
resilient variety of argument, that the combination of deﬂa-
tionism and the truth-conditional theory of meaning is impos-
sible for reasons of circularity. I will show that arguments of
this heirloom variety do not work.
Hereafter, I will use ‘Combination’ as shorthand for ‘the
combination of the deﬂationary view of truth and the truth-
conditional theory of meaning’, and the name ‘Immiscibility’
for the thesis that the deﬂationary view of truth cannot suc-
cessfully be combined with the truth-conditional theory of
meaning. The theory of meaning I have in mind is Davidson’s.
The circularity arguments can be distinguished from other
arguments for Immiscibility by an emphasis on what is prior
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in the order of understanding; they hold that Combination
proposes an unacceptably circular order of understanding of
truth and meaning. Circularity arguments are notable for
their tenacity in the literature, with the earliest example in
Dummett (1959), and recent examples in Brandom (1994,
1997, 2002), Collins (2002), Dummett (1999, 2002, 2003), and
Gupta (1993). But in addition to circularity arguments, there
are two other varieties of argument for Immiscibility, explan-
atory inadequacy arguments, like those of Davidson (1990),
Etchemendy (1988), Horwich (1998), Patterson (2005), Rum-
ﬁtt (1995), and Soames (1997, 1999), and modal confusion
arguments, like that of Soames (1984). Explanatory inade-
quacy arguments hold that Combination leaves important
aspects of meaning unexplained.2 Modal confusion arguments
hold that Combination is incoherent because the two theories
involved have contradictory views about the modal status of
the T-sentences which are at the heart of the truth-conditional
theory of meaning and of some varieties of deﬂationism.3
Thus modal confusion arguments aim to establish Immiscibil-
ity by way of defense of a stronger thesis, Incompatibility,
where Incompatibility is the thesis that the deﬂationary view
of truth and the truth-conditional theory of meaning are
incompatible, strictly speaking -- i.e., that Combination con-
tains a contradiction. This paper deals only with circularity
arguments for Immiscibility, leaving aside discussion of modal
confusion and explanatory inadequacy arguments.
The circularity arguments share the view that Combination
has a circular account of which comes ﬁrst, truth or meaning,
and for this reason I will call them Chicken-and-Egg argu-
ments, but they are not homogenous. There are two distinct
strains: The Interpretive Chicken-and-Egg arguments charge
Combination with circularity in the order in which we come to
know the meaning of a sentence P and come to know its truth-
conditions, whereas the Explanatory Chicken-and-Egg argu-
ments charge Combination with circularity in the order in
which we explain the ideas or concepts of meaning and truth.
(The Explanatory Chicken-and-Eggs are thus hybrid argu-
ments, combining an explanatory inadequacy argument with a
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circularity argument.) I describe Interpretive Chicken-and-Eggs
more fully in section 4 and Explanatory Chicken-and-Eggs in
section 6. I advocate the elimination of circularity argu-
ments; I reject Interpretive Chicken-and-Eggs in section 5
and Explanatory Chicken-and-Eggs in section 7. I show that
Interpretive Chicken-and-Eggs fail to identify any circularity
in Combination, whereas Explanatory Chicken-and-Eggs
identify a genuine, but acceptable, circularity. I begin with a
note about deﬂationism in section 2 and a brief description
of Davidson’s theory of meaning in section 3.
2. DEFLATIONISM
Throughout the paper I assume familiarity with deﬂationism
about truth. I use ‘deﬂationism’ as an umbrella term covering
those theories of truth that deny that the truth predicate’s
function is to attribute a rich, substantial, property of truth
to a sentence or proposition. Where I speak of the redun-
dancy theory, disquotationalism, minimalism, or the ana-
phoric theory, I have speciﬁc deﬂationary theories in mind,
those stemming from Ramsey, Quine, Horwich, and Bran-
dom, respectively. I will introduce very few details, focusing
on the positive account of the truth predicate.
Ramsey’s redundancy theory holds that ‘‘‘It is true that
Caesar was murdered’ means no more than that Caesar was
murdered ... [‘It is true that’ is a phrase] which we sometimes
use for emphasis or for stylistic reasons, or to indicate the
position occupied by the statement in our argument.’’ (1931,
p.106). Quine’s (1970) disquotationalism holds that the truth
predicate has expressive and logical functions. A truth ascrip-
tion like ‘‘‘George is extravagant’’ is true’ is an indirect way
of saying something about the world, that George is extrava-
gant. Universally quantiﬁed truth ascriptions abbreviate inﬁ-
nite conjunctions, and existentially quantiﬁed ascriptions
abbreviate inﬁnite disjunctions. For example, for ‘Everything
George says is true’, each conjunct has the form ‘If George
says ‘‘s’’, then s’. Horwich’s (1998) minimalism holds that the
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truth predicate allows us to capture certain generalizations,
for example generalizing from ‘If Alice sings then Alice sings’
to ‘Every statement of the form ‘‘If p then p’’ is true’, and
allows us to express commitment to propositions that we can-
not access, as in ‘What Alice believes is true’. Brandom’s
(1994) anaphoric theory acknowledges debts to Grover et al.’s
(1975) prosententialism. It holds that locutions such as ‘... is
true’ are prosentence-forming operators. Where a noun
phrase precedes ‘... is true’ to form a prosentence, the noun
phrase determines an anaphoric antecedent, and the content
of the prosentence is inherited from that antecedent.
3. THE TRUTH-CONDITIONAL THEORY OF MEANING
My current project concerns the compatibility of the truth-
conditional theory of meaning with deﬂationism, not its mer-
its, so I will describe but not defend the theory of meaning in
question. Two aspects of Davidson’s theory are immediately
relevant to my argument -- the way in which the theory seeks
to explain meaning itself, and the way in which the theory
tells us we may come to know the meaning of a sentence. The
former bears on Explanatory Chicken-and-Egg arguments,
the latter on Interpretive Chicken-and-Egg arguments.
Davidson supposes (for reasons that we will not delve into
here) that the concept of meaning is an intractable subject for
conceptual analysis, and that the problem of understanding
the concept of meaning, and thus of explaining meaning,
should be approached obliquely.4 On this approach, the theo-
rist sets out to consider what would be required to develop a
meaning theory for a particular language, where a meaning
theory for a language L is a theory that allows interpretation
of all the sentences of L. (A meaning theory is not a theory of
meaning.) Consideration of how to accomplish this practical
task is intended to illuminate the concept of meaning, without
any direct analysis. The idea is that knowing how to construct
a meaning theory would tell us everything we want to know
about meaning, and thus provide a theory of meaning.
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Adoption of the theory-building approach leaves open the
method by which a meaning theory should be constructed.
Davidson proposes that a truth theory for L can serve to give
the meanings of sentences of L.5 A truth theory for L will
entail instances of the schema
(T) s is true-in-L if and only if p
where s is replaced by a structural description of a sentence
of L and p by a sentence of the metalanguage. Davidson ar-
gues that if the truth theory has been constructed in the right
way, then each theorem of form (T) derived in accordance
with certain constraints gives an interpretation of the sentence
that replaces s by specifying the conditions under which the
sentence is true.6 Each of these properly derived T-theorems
should replace p by a good translation of s. Call such
instances of (T) T-sentences. For example, if
‘Ta´ fe´ar glas’ is true-in-Irish if and only if grass is
green
is a T-sentence for Irish, ‘Ta´ fe´ar glas’ means that grass is
green. If we understand the T-sentence (i.e., understand the
metalanguage of the truth theory), and we know the right
things about it -- e.g., that it is a T-theorem that has been de-
rived in the right way -- then we know what ‘Ta´ fe´ar glas’
means. This commits Davidsonians to a claim that will play a
central role in my discussion of Interpretive Chicken-and-Egg
arguments. Where the proper conditions are met:
(1) Knowing the truth-conditions of some sentence P is
suﬃcient for knowing P’s meaning.
The meaning theory for L (i.e., the theory that allows
interpretation of sentences of L) consists of the truth theory
plus the information required to allow use of the truth theory
for interpretation (e.g., that the truth theory has been prop-
erly constructed).
A meaning theory is not yet a theory of meaning; the
meaning theory tells us about meanings, but not about mean-
ing. A theory-builder’s theory of meaning will describe the
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method by which a meaning theory is constructed, and
will make explicit the insights into meaning that have been
gleaned by considering how best to construct a meaning
theory. For example, if Davidson has got things right so far,
the thesis of the indeterminacy of interpretation and the rejec-
tion of the analytic/synthetic distinction will have their place
in the theory of meaning.
Advocates and critics of the theory-building approach
often say that consideration of the method of constructing a
meaning theory will illuminate meaning, or lay bare the
workings of the language.7 The illumination metaphor is
poorly ﬂeshed out by Davidsonians, but the idea is that the
theory tells us something substantial about what meaning is
by outlining the connections between the concept of meaning
and other concepts. The way in which illumination is meant
to take place is indicated by Davidson (1973, 1990, 1996).
The meaning of a sentence, in concert with the speaker’s be-
liefs, desires, and intentions, results in verbal behavior. Mean-
ing, belief, desire, and intention are unobservable; we are to
gain an understanding of the concepts of meaning et al. and
their application to speakers by observing what is accessible --
speech -- and learning how it might be interpreted. The later
Davidson makes it clear that truth is one of the things to be
illuminated in this way. The plan is to arrive at an under-
standing of meaning, truth, and the rest by showing how to
mold a truth theory for L to speaker behavior. There will be
no reduction of meaning to anything else; meaning will be
illuminated by drawing out the connections between the con-
cept of meaning and other concepts. The latter part of
Davidson’s project remains incomplete -- the connections be-
tween the concepts of meaning, belief, desire, intention, truth,
and whatever else is required, have not been fully delineated,
and cannot be fully delineated until the method by which a
meaning theory is constructed has been settled.8
Davidson (1973, 1990) argues that if the illumination of
meaning is to be successful, the evidence for a truth theory for
L cannot ‘‘assume in advance the concepts to be illuminated’’
(1990, p. 314). Partly for this reason, he proposes that we con-
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sider what would be required for radical interpretation -- inter-
pretation of a speaker where the interpreter and the observed
speaker have no shared language. For full illumination,
the evidence must be of a sort that would be available to someone who
does not already know how to interpret utterances the theory is designed
to cover: it must be evidence that can be stated without essential use of
such linguistic concepts as meaning, interpretation, synonymy, and the
like. (Davidson, 1973, p. 128)
Given Davidson’s admonition that the radical interpreter’s
evidence cannot assume the concepts to be illuminated, one
way to show Immiscibility for reasons of circularity would be
to show that, for Combination, the radical interpreter’s evi-
dence is so tainted. However, there is no reason to suppose
that the evidence is suspect in this way, and to date Circular-
ity arguments have not taken this tack. The crucial evidence
for the radical interpreter is that a speaker holds a sentence
true. Holding true is an easily recognized, coarse-grained pro-
attitude towards a sentence. Recognizing that a speaker holds
a sentence true allows the radical interpreter to propose an
instance of (T) as a tentative candidate for a T-sentence for
the speaker. The radical interpreter’s evidence that someone
holds something true is behavioral evidence, perfectly free of
the concepts to be illuminated. Certainly the interpreted
speaker’s verbal behavior is inﬂuenced by what she takes to
be true and what she takes sentences to mean; these facts
make interpretation based on behavior a worthwhile exercise,
but do not indicate that the radical interpreter’s evidence it-
self assumes the concepts to be illuminated. The appearance
of the word ‘true’ in the phrase ‘holding true’ should not mis-
lead. To judge that a speaker holds a sentence true is to code
a speaker’s behavior. Judgments like this are part of the radi-
cal interpreter’s technique. While the evidence for the inter-
preter’s truth theory must be free of the concepts to be
illuminated, Davidson offers no reason to suppose that the
radical interpreter’s methods must be equally innocent.
There are some clear limits on the deﬂationary theories
that might be combined with the truth-conditional theory of
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meaning. First, the meaning theory must meet Davidson’s
goal of explaining compositionality, presumably by way of
incorporating a compositional truth theory. So a deﬂationism
that forms part of Combination must permit a Tarski-style
recursive deﬁnition of ‘true-in-L’, thereby allowing the deriva-
tion of T-sentences as theorems from axioms that specify val-
ues for subsentential expressions of L. Deﬂationary theories
that obviously meet this requirement are described by Leeds
(1978) and David (1994). Depending on the details, some
overtly non-recursive deﬂationary theories might be pressed
into service as well. For example, a deﬂationary theory that
treats certain true instances of (T) as partial deﬁnitions of
truth may suﬃce, provided that a recursive deﬁnition of ‘true-
in-L’ is permitted after the fact, i.e., not as a primary deﬁni-
tion of truth, but in addition to a primary deﬁnition. How-
ever, a deﬂationary theory that allows no recursive deﬁnition
of ‘true-in-L’ will not do for Combination. Second, since by
deﬁnition a radical interpreter and her observed speaker be-
gin with no shared language, deﬂationary theories that can-
not accommodate truth attributions to sentences one does not
understand are ruled out. Thus Resnik’s (1990) immanent
truth, which does not permit an attribution of truth to a sen-
tence of a language other than one’s own, and Field’s (1994)
pure disquotationalism, which does not permit attribution of
truth to a sentence not in one’s own idiolect, could not form
part of Combination. But while it is clear that not just any
deﬂationary theory can form part of Combination, the limits
just discussed do not rule out Combination entirely. The
question I will address is whether Combination is doomed by
the circularity arguments.
We are now ready to turn our attention to the ﬁrst strain
of circularity argument, the Interpretive Chicken-and-Egg.
4. INTERPRETIVE CHICKEN-AND-EGG ARGUMENTS
Interpretive Chicken-and-Egg arguments hold that Combina-
tion describes a circle in the order in which we come to know
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the meaning of a sentence P and come to know a statement
of its truth-conditions. Dummett provides the locus classicus
for Chicken-and-Egg arguments (of all kinds) in his assess-
ment of the redundancy theory of truth.
[If] we accept the redundancy theory... we must abandon the idea which
we naturally have that the notions of truth and falsity play an essential
roˆle in any account either of the meaning of statements in general or of
the meaning of a particular statement. ...[In] order that someone should
gain from the explanation that P is true in such-and-such circumstances
an understanding of the sense of P, he must already know what it means
to say of P that it is true. If when he enquires into this he is told that the
only explanation is that to say that P is true is the same as to assert P, it
will follow that in order to understand what is meant by saying that P is
true, he must already know the sense of asserting P, which was precisely
what was supposed to be being explained to him. (Dummett, 1959, p. 7)9
Dummett tells us in the passage that the redundancy the-
ory forces the abandonment of two ideas -- that the notions
of truth and falsity play an essential role in any account of
the meaning of statements in general or of the meaning of a
particular statement. However, the argument as stated does
not show that the redundancy theory forces abandonment of
either of those ideas. Nor does it directly address claim
(1) Knowing the truth-conditions of some sentence P is
suﬃcient for knowing P’s meaning.
Rather, it shows at best that with the redundancy theory,
we must abandon the distinct idea:
(2) we can come to know the meaning (sense) of a sen-
tence P by previously coming to know the truth-
conditions of P.10
Dummett believes (2) is entailed by (1); if the hapless stu-
dent is to ‘‘gain from the explanation that P is true in such-
and-such circumstances an understanding of the sense of P,
he must already know what it means to say of P that it is
true’’ (emphasis mine).
The redundancy theory tells us that ‘‘to say that P is true
is the same as to assert P.’’ So, to understand ‘‘what it means
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to say of P that it is true’’ (and thus to understand what it is
for P to be ‘‘true in such-and-such circumstances’’) we must
understand what it is to assert P. To understand what it is to
assert P, we must know P’s meaning (sense). In short, the
redundancy theory is committed to:
(3) We must know P’s meaning in order to know the
truth-conditions of P.
As Dummett sees it, (3) tells us that we must ‘‘already
know the sense of asserting P’’ to know the truth-conditions
of P (emphasis mine). So he believes that (3) entails:
(4) We can come to know the truth-conditions of P
only if we have previously come to know the mean-
ing of P.
From (2) and (4), it follows that
(5) We can come to know the meaning of a sentence P
by previously coming to know the truth-conditions
of P only if we have previously come to know the
meaning of P.
But it is circular to suppose that we can come to know the
meaning of a sentence only if we have previously come to know
the meaning of the very same sentence. Since (5) follows from
(2) and (4), Combination is circular, and must be rejected.
Dummett continues to embrace his 1959 argument. We ﬁnd
similar arguments, with Davidson ﬁrmly in mind, in Dum-
mett (1999) with regard to minimalism, (2002) with regard to
both disquotationalism and minimalism,11 and (2003) with
regard to deﬂationism deﬁned to include Horwich’s minimal-
ism, McGrath’s weak deﬂationism, and disquotationalism.12
Each argument accuses Combination of circularity, some-
times explicitly, sometimes implicitly. With regard to a num-
ber of deﬂationary theories broadly understood, we are
told that Combination is ‘‘grossly circular ...’’ (2003, p. 24),
and where minimalism is concerned, that Combination is
‘‘caught in a vicious circle’’ (2002, p. 252); with regard to
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disquotationalism, we are told that it is ‘‘impotent to charac-
terize a notion of truth capable of serving as a theoretical no-
tion within a theory of meaning’’ (2002, p. 256). All the
arguments use (4) as a premise.13 The use of (2) as a premise
is explicit in Dummett (1999), but not in Dummett (2002) or
(2003), where the explicit commitment of Davidsonians is
rendered more along the lines of (1). However, (5) does not
follow from (4) without (2), so Dummett must assume either
that (1) implies (2), or that (2) is an independent commitment
of the truth-conditional theory of meaning.
Gupta (1993) also considers an Interpretive Chicken-and-
Egg, this one for a T-biconditional-based form of deﬂation-
ism, e.g., some versions of disquotationalism. Gupta’s variant
requires that deﬂationism be committed to the claim that the
meaning of ‘true’ is given by instances of (T). (Gupta argues
that deﬂationism ought not be committed to that claim, and
hence does not endorse Immiscibility on the grounds of the
Chicken-and-Egg he describes.) The claim ‘‘suggests the fol-
lowing picture of our acquisition of ‘true’: We ﬁrst learn some
ﬁrst-order words (‘snow,’ ‘white,’ etc.) and then we arrive at
‘true’ deﬁnitionally through the T-biconditionals.’’ (Gupta,
1993, p. 69). Thus deﬂationism is committed to (4); ‘‘our
understanding of ‘true,’ according to the picture, rests on our
prior understanding of ‘snow is white’‘‘ (1993, p. 69, emphasis
mine). Gupta concludes: ‘‘Given this picture, it follows imme-
diately that we cannot explain our understanding of ‘snow is
white’ in terms of our understanding of ‘true.’’’ (1993, p. 69) --
i.e., we cannot accept (1). The purported Davidsonian com-
mitment to (2) is implicit. But if the conclusion is that Combi-
nation is circular, (2) is required to generate the circularity.14
5. WHY INTERPRETIVE CHICKEN-AND-EGG ARGUMENTS
DO NOT WORK
The reader may have sensed my skepticism regarding (2) and
(4). I will argue that the Interpretive Chicken-and-Egg argu-
ments do not demonstrate Immiscibility, on the grounds that
Combination is not committed to either (2) or (4). First, I
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argue that (1) does not imply (2), and that Davidsonians are
not independently committed to (2). Then I argue that (3)
does not imply (4), and that deﬂationists are not indepen-
dently committed to (4).
Claim (1) has the form ‘knowing q is sufﬁcient for know-
ing p’. The proponent of the Interpretive Chicken-and-Egg
wrongly assumes that if knowing q is sufﬁcient for knowing
p, then it ought to be possible to know q independently of
knowing p, so that it ought to be possible to know q prior to
knowing p. But consider cases where p is a constituent of q;
suppose that q is ‘Alice and Mike are going to the party’ and
p is ‘Alice is going to the party’. In cases like this, knowing q
is sufﬁcient for knowing p, but I could not know q indepen-
dently of, or prior to, knowing p. Further, consider cases
where p and q are related in such a way that to know q is to
know p; again, while knowing q is sufﬁcient for knowing p, I
could not know q independently of, or prior to, knowing p.
For example, suppose that q is ‘Jim is a bachelor’ and p is
‘Jim is an unmarried man’, or (more controversially, depend-
ing on one’s views on other philosophical matters) that q is
‘the present Queen of England is married’ and p is ‘Elizabeth
Windsor is married’. In these cases, getting to know q is a
way of getting to know p, but I cannot get to know q before
getting to know p. Since ‘knowing q is sufﬁcient for knowing
p’ does not imply ‘we can come to know p by previously
coming to know q’, (1) does not imply (2).
Claim (1), as you will recall, tells us that knowing the
truth-conditions of some sentence P is suﬃcient for knowing
P’s meaning. On Davidson’s view, this is a case where p and
q are the same, so that (under the right conditions) to know
q is to know p. It should not be possible to know q ﬁrst, and
then learn p. So it should not be possible to know the truth-
conditions of P prior to, or independently of, knowing P’s
meaning. But this raises a question: How can we get to know
P’s meaning by getting to know P’s truth-conditions, if not
by getting to know P’s truth-conditions ﬁrst, i.e., if not in the
order speciﬁed by (2)?
CLAIRE HORISK280
While a Davidsonian theory of meaning describes what
would be sufﬁcient for interpretation, it does not describe
what ordinary speakers use for interpretation.15
Kurt utters the words ‘Es regnet’ and under the right conditions we know
that he has said that it is raining. Having identified his utterance as inten-
tional and linguistic, we are able to go on to interpret his words.... What
could we know that would enable us to do this? How could we come to
know it? The first of these questions is not the same as the question what
we do know that enables us to interpret the words of others.... The second
question, how we could come to have knowledge that would serve to
yield interpretations, does not ... concern the actual history of language
acquisition. It is thus a doubly hypothetical question: given a theory that
would make interpretation possible, what evidence plausibly available to a
potential interpreter would support the theory to a reasonable degree?
(1973, p. 125)
Davidson’s answer to the ﬁrst question -- what could we
know that would allow interpretation of an utterance? -- is gi-
ven by claim (1); under the right conditions, knowing the
truth-conditions of the utterance would be sufﬁcient. The an-
swer to the second question -- how could we come to know
whatever it is that allows interpretation of an utterance? --
will tell us in what order the knowledge is acquired, thus con-
ﬁrming or denying claim (2). But the second question is
‘‘doubly hypothetical’’; his question does not ‘‘concern the
actual history of language acquisition’’, rather, it concerns the
ﬁctional history of the radical interpreter (1973, p. 125).
Since the radical interpreter’s ﬁctional doings inform the
answer to Davidson’s second question, in answering it we
must consider what happens as the interpreter comes to know
the meanings of sentences. Crucially, he does not ﬁrst come
to believe the T-sentences he develops and then succeed in
interpreting the sentences of the language. Rather, he inter-
prets as he goes -- giving tentative interpretations, and thus
instances of (T); proposing tentative axioms for the truth the-
ory; generating new T-theorems and testing them; revising
existing interpretations and existing instances of (T). The ﬁrst
interpretations are more than likely poor ones, the last inter-
pretations good ones, so that the last instances of (T) are
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T-sentences. His procedure has similarities to that dismissed
as circular by Chicken-and-Egg arguments. He generates an
instance of (T) for P, because he believes P is to be inter-
preted in a certain way; he tests to see whether his instance of
(T) ﬁts the evidence; he comes to a new belief about P’s inter-
pretation and its truth-condition, and so on. Once the inter-
pretation is suﬃciently well justiﬁed, his beliefs about P’s
meaning alchemize into knowledge about P’s meaning, and
his beliefs about the proper T-sentence for P alchemize into
knowledge about P’s truth-conditions. The transmutation
happens all at once -- neither comes ﬁrst. Davidsonians can
hold that knowledge of the truth-conditions of P suﬃces for
its interpretation, without holding that the radical interpreter
comes to know P’s meaning by ﬁrst coming to know its
truth-condition. He comes to know both at once. Thus
Davidson, and thereby Combination, does not hold claim (2).
It does not immediately follow that there is nothing to fear
from the Interpretive Chicken-and-Egg arguments. Without
(2), Gupta and Dummett cannot derive (5). However, Gupta
and Dummett argue that on a deﬂationist view, one must
know the meaning of a sentence before knowing its truth-con-
ditions; hence they might argue that even if Davidson is not
committed to (2), Immiscibility holds because deﬂationism’s
commitment to (4) means that deﬂationism cannot allow that
we come to know a sentence’s meaning and its truth-condi-
tion simultaneously. But this line of objection is easily dis-
missed.
The crux is the interpretation of the phrase ‘in order’ in
deﬂationism’s (3) -- we must know P’s meaning in order to
know the truth-conditions of P. As I see it, (3) tells us that
knowing P’s meaning is a necessary condition for knowing
the truth-conditions of P -- a condition that will be met with
Combination, because knowing P’s meaning and knowing P’s
truth-conditions amount to the same thing. I argued above
that ‘knowing q is suﬃcient for knowing p’ does not imply
‘we can come to know p by previously coming to know q’;
similar examples demonstrate that ‘knowing p is necessary for
knowing q’ does not imply ‘we can come to know q only if
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we have previously come to know p’. So (3) does not imply
(4). As Gupta and Dummett see it, knowledge of the meaning
of a sentence comes ﬁrst, and knowledge of what it is for that
sentence to be true comes second, so that deﬂationists are
committed to (4). But the Gupta/Dummett interpretation is
not faithful to deﬂationism’s essence.
Deﬂationism emphasizes that to attribute truth to a sen-
tence is not to attribute any rich property to that sentence.
Given the triviality of a truth attribution for deﬂationism, it
is implausible that there is any real sense in which knowing a
sentence’s meaning precedes knowing its truth-condition. Cer-
tainly, given deﬂationism, one must know a sentence’s mean-
ing in order to know what it is for it be true, but it is difﬁcult
to give any credence to the idea that knowing the meaning of
the sentence comes ﬁrst, before knowing what it is for it be
true. Take three contemporary contenders for a deﬂationary
account of truth. On Brandom’s anaphoric theory a truth
attribution to ‘snow is white’ inherits its content from the
quoted sentence, ‘snow is white’, just as a pronoun inherits its
referent from its anaphoric antecedent. But we know the ref-
erent of a pronoun immediately upon knowing the referent of
its anaphoric antecedent, and similarly, we know what it is
for ‘snow is white’ to be true immediately on knowing the
content of the sentence. On a disquotationalist view, to know
that ‘snow is white’ is true is just to know that snow is white,
while on a minimalist view, to know that ‘snow is white’ is
true is to know that the proposition expressed by ‘snow is
white’ is true, and that is just to know that snow is white. So
for both disquotationalism and minimalism, on knowing
what ‘snow is white’ means, we immediately know what it is
for it to be true. Generally, on a deﬂationist view, it is
implausible that one must already know the sense of a sen-
tence in order to know its truth-condition (Dummett) or that
our understanding of a sentence is prior to our understanding
of its truth-condition (Gupta). Knowledge of the meaning of
a sentence and knowledge of its truth-condition are too close
on a deﬂationist view for there to be any temporal lapse or
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additional cognitive step to be taken between knowing the
meaning of P and knowing what it is for P to be true. So
Combination can hold that we come to know P’s meaning
and P’s truth-condition simultaneously.
As a last point regarding Interpretive Chicken-and-Eggs, let
me note that (3) implies (1). (3) tells us that I cannot know the
truth-conditions of P without knowing its meaning. But then if
I know P’s truth-conditions I must know its meaning, so
knowing P’s truth-conditions is suﬃcient for knowing its
meaning. (3) and (1) alone do not generate Immiscibility.
Let me summarize my rejection of Interpretive Chicken-and-
Egg arguments. The Interpretive Chicken-and-Egg arguments
say that Combination is circular because Davidsonians are
committed to (2) and deﬂationists are committed to (4). How-
ever a Davidsonian theory of meaning is not committed to (2).
While the Davidsonian theory is committed to (1) -- knowing
the truth-conditions of some sentence P is suﬃcient for know-
ing P’s meaning -- this is because, in the right circumstances,
knowing the truth-conditions of P is knowing P’s meaning. On
the Davidsonian view, the path by which we might come to
know P’s meaning is laid out in the ﬁctional history of the rad-
ical interpreter, who comes to know the truth-conditions of P
and P’s meaning simultaneously. This position is available to
the deﬂationist; while it is true, on a deﬂationist view, that one
must know P’s meaning in order to know the truth-conditions
of P, this does not indicate that knowing P’s meaning precedes
knowing the truth-conditions of P.
6. EXPLANATORY CHICKEN-AND-EGG ARGUMENTS
From the perspective of the Interpretive Chicken-and-Egg
arguments, the Davidsonian account should allow interpreta-
tion of sentences of L. The Explanatory Chicken-and-Egg
arguments shift our attention from interpretation of L to the
illumination of meaning promised by Davidsonians, holding
that Combination mistakes the proper order in which we
explain the ideas or concepts of meaning and truth. In this
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section, I show that the most convincing Explanatory Chick-
en-and-Egg arguments share a premise: If the notion of
meaning is prior to the notion of truth, we cannot use the
notion of truth to give an explanation of the notion of mean-
ing. I reject this premise in section 7.
Early examples of the Explanatory Chicken-and-Egg in
Gupta (1993) and Brandom (1994) are not convincing, be-
cause they do not make a clear distinction between meaning
itself and the meanings of sentences. Gupta describes a ‘‘ten-
sion ... over two ways of reading the T-biconditionals: as elu-
cidating the meanings of sentences and as elucidating ‘true’.
The two ways preclude each other’’ (1993, p. 68, my empha-
ses) because the ‘‘former presupposes the concept of truth and
uses the T-biconditionals to explain meaning; the latter pre-
supposes meaning and uses the T-biconditionals to explain
truth’’ (1993, p. 68, my emphases). Not so. On Gupta’s two
ways of reading the T-biconditionals, the former presupposes
an understanding of ‘true’ (not the concept of truth) to eluci-
date meanings of sentences, and the latter presupposes mean-
ings of sentences (not the concept of meaning) and uses the
T-biconditionals to elucidate ‘true’.16 Brandom is in a similar
muddle, although he speaks of contents and contentfulness,
rather than meanings and meaning (1994, p. 329). In these
early arguments, the conclusions are framed for an Explana-
tory Chicken-and-Egg, so the premises should claim that
Combination presupposes an understanding of the concept of
meaning in order to explain the concept of truth, and presup-
poses an understanding of the concept of truth in order to
explain the concept of meaning. But the actual premises,
which are suitable for an Interpretive Chicken-and-Egg, claim
that Combination presupposes an understanding of sentence
meanings in order to understand the use of ‘true’, and an
understanding of ‘true’ in order to understand sentence mean-
ings. As a consequence, it is diﬃcult to give a compelling
reading of these arguments.17
Fortunately, Brandom (1997, 2002) oﬀers a more clearly
conceived Explanatory Chicken-and-Egg argument with refer-
ence to his own deﬂationary theory, the anaphoric theory,
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and Dummett (2003) and Collins (2002) with reference to
deﬂationary theories more broadly. The arguments describe
the immiscibility in terms of explanatory priority; the deﬂa-
tionist takes the notion of meaning to be prior to the notion
of truth, the truth-conditional theory of meaning takes the
notion of truth to be prior to the notion of meaning. The def-
lationist can explain truth, given the notion of meaning, and
the truth-conditional semanticist can explain meaning, given
the notion of truth; but neither can do both. But why not?
An explanation of a notion, we gather, can employ only prior
notions. So the crucial premise is this: If the notion of mean-
ing is prior to the notion of truth, we cannot use the notion
of truth to give an explanation of the notion of meaning.
First Brandom:
... I think that one cannot explain the notion of anaphora that is relied
upon by broadly prosentential theories without appealing to an anteced-
ent notion of propositional content -- what in the simplest cases is inherited
by a prosentence from its anaphoric antecedent. That is, one cannot enti-
tle oneself to employ a notion of anaphora in one’s semantic theory un-
less one is already entitled to use a notion of propositional content. Thus
if one’s explanation of ‘true’, and hence of truth conditions, is dependent
upon a notion of anaphora, one cannot without circularity explain the
notion of propositional contents in terms of truth or truth-conditions. For
those notions cannot be made available for explanatory use in advance of
an account of propositional content. (Brandom, 2002, p. 117)18
Brandom goes on to tell us that ‘‘orthodox disquotational
accounts’’ are in the same boat as the anaphoric theory
(2002, p. 117).
Now Dummett, using the term ‘minimalism’ loosely as a
catch-all for a number of varieties of deﬂationism:
Minimalism conflicts with a truth-conditional theory of meaning because
it assumes meaning as given antecedently to the notion of truth. This is
most obvious for that version of minimalism which regards truth as pri-
marily an attribute of propositions. Obviously, you cannot know what
proposition a statement expresses unless you know what it means. What
proposition is expressed by a statement depends upon that aspect of the
statement’s meaning that Frege called its ‘sense’ .... The notion of the
meaning of a statement is thus prior to that of a proposition; and a mini-
malist of this variety is taking the notion of a proposition as prior to the
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notion of truth. But a truth-conditional theory of meaning explains mean-
ing in terms of truth, and thus takes truth as prior to meaning. The two
theories are thus irreconcilable. (Dummett, 2003, p. 22)
Finally, Collins:
Very roughly, deﬂationism seeks to explicate truth in terms of meaning,
while the truth conditional conception of meaning seeks the converse, to
explicate meaning in terms of truth. So, the explanations oﬀered by the
two conceptions apparently run in opposite directions and are thus
incompatible. (2002, p. 497)
[A deflationist] seeks to account for truth via some notion of content or
meaning, and it is this explanatory priority given to meaning which makes
for deflationism’s incompatibility with a truth based account of meaning.
(2002, p. 508)
These authors do not agree on the exact nature of the circu-
larity. For example, Dummett tells us that the circle arises be-
cause minimalists use the notion of a proposition to explain
the notion of truth, and Davidsonians use the notion of truth
to explain the notion of meaning, but that the notion of
meaning is needed to explain the notion of a proposition.19
On the other hand Brandom tells us that the circle arises be-
cause anaphoric deﬂationists use the notion of anaphora to
explain the notion of truth, and Davidsonians use the notion
of truth to explain the notion of meaning (in Brandom’s
terms, propositional content), but that the notion of meaning
(i.e., propositional content) is needed to explain the notion of
anaphora. What all three authors share is their insistence that
Combination cannot explain the notion of meaning in terms
of truth if the notion of meaning is prior to that of truth; one
assumes that this also motivates the mongrel Chicken-and-Egg
arguments of Gupta (1993) and Brandom (1994). However,
none of the arguments defend the shared premise by making
clear why this explanatory structure is impossible. I reject this
premise in objecting to Explanatory Chicken-and-Egg argu-
ments. If my objection is successful, we need not dwell on the
diﬀerences between Brandom, Collins, and Dummett.
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7. WHY EXPLANATORY CHICKEN-AND-EGG ARGUMENTS
FAIL
More fully, the disputed premise says: If the notion of mean-
ing is prior to the notion of truth, we cannot use the notion
of truth to give an explanation of the notion of meaning. I
take it that by ‘notion’, Brandom, Collins, and Dummett
mean something like ‘idea’ or ‘concept’. In my discussion, I
will stick with the woolly term, ‘notion’, for fear of stacking
the deck with a more precise term. The premise is an instance
of the Priority Assumption:
If notion A is prior to notion B, we cannot use no-
tion B to give an explanation of notion A.
The premise under attack gains its plausibility from the Pri-
ority Assumption, but while the Priority Assumption is apt in
some circumstances, I will argue that it cannot be applied here.
My task is complicated by the absence of an explicit ac-
count of what it means to say that one notion is prior to an-
other, since the aptness of the Priority Assumption rests both
on the kind of explanation under consideration, and on what
is meant by the priority of one notion to another. Take two
examples. (These examples do not exhaust the options -- there
are other potential interpretations of ‘explanation’ and of ‘no-
tion A is prior to notion B’.) First suppose that an explana-
tion of notion A that uses notion B should allow me to grasp
notion A given my grasp of notion B (among other things,
perhaps), and that to say that notion A is prior to notion B
is to say that notion B cannot be grasped without a grasp of
notion A. Then the Priority Assumption (that if notion A is
prior to notion B, we cannot use notion B to give an expla-
nation of notion A) is justiﬁed. Second, suppose that an
explanation of notion A that uses notion B should tell me
what the relationship is between two already grasped notions
A and B, and that to say that notion A is prior to notion B
is to say that in normal development, children grasp notion A
before grasping notion B. Then the Priority Assumption is
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not justiﬁed. In these examples, both kinds of explanation
mentioned could be genuinely informative -- the ﬁrst by giv-
ing me a new notion that I did not already have (e.g., the no-
tion of a cappuccino given my notion of an espresso), the
second by revealing the connections between notions that I
do have (e.g., the relationship between the notions of a
square and of a right angle). In order to assess the aptness of
the Priority Assumption for the case in hand, then, we must
think both about the kind of explanation of meaning offered
by the truth-conditional theory of meaning, and about the
sense in which deﬂationism takes the notion of meaning to be
prior to that of truth, and the truth-conditional theorist of
meaning takes the notion of truth to be prior to that of
meaning.
As evidence for the claim that deﬂationism takes the notion
of meaning to be prior to that of truth, Brandom says that
the notion of propositional content is prior to the notion of
anaphora employed by prosententialism (2002, p. 117; 1997,
pp. 147--148), Dummett tells us that the notion of meaning is
prior to the notion of a proposition employed by minimalism
(2003, p. 22), and Collins mentions the roˆle of the truth from
meaning principle ‘‘If S means that p in L, then S is true iﬀ
p’’ in both sentential and propositional deﬂationism (2002, p.
506). The deﬂationary theories are familiar to very few of
those who are competent with the notion of truth. So the
purported priority of meaning to truth is nothing to do with
the order in which the notions are graspable, or the order in
which they are normally grasped. In addition, we can safely
rule out the idea that the notion of truth is a compound no-
tion, composed of the notion of meaning and other notions --
there is no hint of this kind of construction in the evidence
cited. Rather, the idea seems to be that a philosophical expla-
nation of truth along these lines invokes the notion of mean-
ing. Similarly, the purported priority of truth to meaning for
the truth-conditional theorist of meaning has nothing to do
with the order in which the notions are graspable, or the or-
der in which they are normally grasped. Davidson’s theories
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are familiar to very few of those who are competent with the
notion of meaning, and in addition, Davidsonians make no
pretence that their theory is an empirical theory of what is
known by speakers of a language. Davidsonians give no hint
that the notion of meaning is constructed from that of truth
-- quite the opposite -- so we can rule out the idea that the
notion of meaning is composed of the notion of truth and
other notions. Again, the idea seems to be that a philosophi-
cal explanation of meaning along these lines invokes the no-
tion of truth.
‘Notion A is prior to notion B’, in this context, means that
notion A is invoked in the philosophical explanation of no-
tion B. Cashing out the idea of priority, the Priority Assump-
tion tells us that if notion A is invoked in the philosophical
explanation of notion B, we cannot use notion B to give an
explanation of notion A. While we now have a clear idea of
what is meant by saying that notion A is prior to notion B,
the aptness of the assumption is still in question, because its
aptness depends on the kind of explanation being given of
notion A. The application of the Priority Assumption can be
justiﬁed either by metaphysical or epistemological consider-
ations about philosophical explanations. With metaphysical
considerations, the justiﬁcation rests on the relationship be-
tween the notions of A and B. The relationship between the
notions of A and B may be dictated by the relationship be-
tween the properties or objects or relations A and B -- what-
ever the notion is a notion of -- but of course this need not
be the case, particularly where A and B are poorly under-
stood.20 With epistemological considerations, the justiﬁcation
rests on the roˆle that an explanation has for us in gaining an
understanding of notion A. I will consider both metaphysical
and epistemological justiﬁcations for the Priority Assumption.
In considering metaphysical justiﬁcations for the Priority
Assumption, it will be helpful to follow Avramides (1989) in
distinguishing reductive analyses from reciprocal analyses. A
reductive (or new-level) analysis reveals that understanding of
some concept K is to be achieved by understanding some
other concepts K1,..., Kn, where K1,..., Kn could replace K
CLAIRE HORISK290
without residue. A reciprocal (or same-level) analysis tells us
that understanding of a concept K is to be gained by discern-
ing its place in a system of interrelated concepts K1,..., Kn.
21
The reductive analyses attempt to break down concepts into
simpler or more fundamental concepts, whereas the reciprocal
analyses do not attempt to break down or decompose the
target concept.
It is widely held that reductive analyses should be con-
strained along the lines suggested by the Priority Assumption
for metaphysical reasons.22 David identiﬁes in Kant the idea
that ‘‘conceptual analysis is the mereology of concepts. The
concept to be deﬁned is a complex whole, and the deﬁning
concept should be the logical sum (or the logical product) of
the constituent parts of the deﬁned concept’’ (1993, p. 112).
On the Kantian picture, circular analyses are ruled out. In a
circular analysis, the analysandum appears in the analysans.
But the analysandum must not appear in the analysans, be-
cause the things in the analysans should be parts of the ana-
lysandum, and the analysandum cannot be part of itself.23
Thus where reductive analyses are concerned there is a meta-
physical argument for the Priority Assumption. However, this
metaphysical argument has no force for reciprocal analyses.
A reciprocal analysis does not propose to break down a com-
plex concept into simpler parts, so the mereological reason to
support the Priority Assumption for reductive analyses does
not apply to reciprocal analyses. Further, the literature on
circularity oﬀers no other metaphysical reason to suppose
that the Priority Assumption should apply to reciprocal anal-
yses.
The metaphysical justiﬁcation for the Priority Assumption
will apply to our case if Davidson’s truth-conditional theory
of meaning is meant as a reductive analysis. But as Davidson
has made perfectly clear, he does not offer a reductive analy-
sis, he offers a reciprocal analysis, that enriches our under-
standing of meaning by outlining the connections between the
concepts of truth and meaning, and other concepts.24 So
there is no metaphysical justiﬁcation for the Priority Assump-
tion in this case. Now, deﬂationists might worry that the
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account of truth will not be truly deﬂationary if they have
any truck with a reciprocal analysis. But the worry may be
unfounded. The issue must turn on the role of truth in the re-
ciprocal account. If truth’s role in the reciprocal analysis is
restricted to logical and expressive functions, as Ko¨lbel and
Williams argue, then perhaps there is no cause for concern.
It remains to be seen whether there is an epistemological
motivation for the Priority Assumption. The epistemological
motivation for the Priority Assumption may apply to either
reductive or reciprocal analyses, but since Davidson’s analysis
is reciprocal we may limit our discussion appropriately. Hum-
berstone gives a helpful summary of analytical circularity.
[The] usual way of explaining why circularity is a flaw in a putative anal-
ysis adverts to the role analysis is supposed to play for thinkers: if a con-
cept is being explained, the explanation should not be one intelligible only
to those already possessing the concept. This is just a formulation at the
level of concepts of the usual grounds for objecting to circularity in the
definition of terms: we are supposed to be explaining how the term de-
ﬁned is to be used in terms already familiar to one for whom the explana-
tion is necessary. Analytical circularity is a fault, then, when and because
it obstructs the transfer of understanding [which] an account of the appli-
cation conditions of a concept may be designed to eﬀect: from under-
standing of the terms in which the account is couched to understanding
the concept being analysed. (Humberstone, 1997, p. 251)
So analytical circularity is an epistemic vice in an explana-
tion if it blocks understanding of a target concept for a thin-
ker who is not yet familiar with the target concept. If we
conceive of the vice of circularity along these lines, we must
look to the roˆle that an explanation plays for thinkers in order
to decide whether or not a circularity in the explanation is vi-
cious. If the explanation is meant to function like a deﬁnition,
providing an explanation of notion A to those who have no
grasp of it, then the Priority Assumption applies -- B cannot
be used in the explanation of A if A is prior to B. But the
kind of explanation offered by a Davidsonian about meaning
does not have this roˆle. I have already pointed out that the
notions of truth and meaning are familiar to those with
no philosophical expertise; those of us with philosophical
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expertise are just as familiar with these notions. The explana-
tion to be given of truth and meaning is not an explanation of
notions that are completely alien to us, so it need not start
from scratch.25 So this epistemological justiﬁcation for the
application of the Priority Assumption does not apply to our
case. We have already seen that the metaphysical justiﬁcation
for the Priority Assumption does not apply, since Davidson’s
analysis is reciprocal rather than reductive. Thus there is no
justiﬁcation for applying the Priority Assumption to our case.
The reader may feel that I have neglected one reason for
avoiding circularity in an account: The risk of triviality. But
the neglect has no bearing on my conclusion, for two
reasons. First, Combination is not trivial; even Collins’
truth-from-meaning principle, however widely accepted, tells
us something.26 Second, while some circular accounts are
trivial, circularity is not in itself evidence of triviality. In
support of this point, Blackburn (1993) oﬀers an example of
a false circular account of a response-dependent concept: ‘‘X
is boring ” we tend to be bored by X under normal condi-
tions’’ (p. 261); Yablo (1993) oﬀers an example of an infor-
mative circular deﬁnition: ‘‘x is a number =df x is zero or x
is some number’s successor’’ (p. 150). A trivial account
should be neither false nor informative, so circularity alone
does not indicate triviality.27 If proponents of Immiscibility
wish to argue that Combination is impossible for reasons of
triviality, their argument cannot conclude by identifying a
circularity in the combined account. More must be done to
demonstrate that Combination is not only circular but also
trivial.28
To conclude, the Explanatory Chicken-and-Egg arguments
have an instance of the Priority Assumption as a necessary pre-
mise: If the notion of meaning is prior to the notion of truth,
we cannot use the notion of truth to explain the notion of
meaning. The Priority Assumption is entirely appropriate for
metaphysical reasons with regard to reductive analyses. But we
are concerned with reciprocal analyses, where the assumption
is appropriate only when the analysis or explanation is meant
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to play the epistemic roˆle of making familiar an unknown
concept. The Davidsonian and deﬂationary explanations are
not like that -- we already know something about truth and
meaning, and the epistemic roˆle of the explanations is to dee-
pen our acquaintance. Thus the Explanatory Chicken-and-Egg
arguments fail.
8. CONCLUSION
I have rejected the circularity arguments for Immiscibility.
However, proponents of Immiscibility have other arguments,
the modal confusion and explanatory inadequacy arguments,
in their arsenal. At least some of these arguments will be less
easily dismissed.29
NOTES
1 See also Lepore and Ludwig (2003) and Ludwig (2003) who argue that
truth-theoretic semantics can be conducted regardless of the nature of
truth, and Williams (2004).
2 Williams (1999) and Ko¨lbel (2001, 2002) reject explanatory inadequacy
arguments because they think truth has an expressive but not an explana-
tory role in the truth-conditional theory of meaning. But see Bar-On et al.
(2000).
3 Some modal confusion arguments hold that the deﬂationist’s T-sen-
tences are necessary, the truth-conditional theorist’s T-sentences contin-
gent, others that the truth-conditional theorist’s T-sentences are empirical,
whereas the deﬂationist’s are not.
4 For discussion see Dummett (1975, 1976), McDowell (1980) and Avra-
mides (1989). For my purposes, we may skip over the details of the argu-
ment for the theory-building approach, of Davidson’s argument that a
truth theory can serve as part of a meaning theory, and of the method by
which a T-theorem must be derived in order for it to be interpretive.
Accessible accounts may be found in Lepore and Ludwig (2003) and
Platts (1997).
5 Here I follow Ludwig (2002) and Lepore and Ludwig (2003) in distin-
guishing a truth theory for L from a meaning theory for L.
6 This is a much disputed claim. See Davidson (1973), and numerous
further discussions, e.g., Higginbotham (1991), Segal (1999), Rumﬁtt
(2001), Ko¨lbel (2001), Lepore and Ludwig (2005).
CLAIRE HORISK294
7 See, for example, Davidson (1973) p. 137, Foster (1976) pp. 6--7,
McDowell (1980) p. 117, Dummett (1993) p. 13, Ludwig (2003) pp. 26--
27, Lepore and Ludwig (2003) pp. 52, 54.
8 The metaphor of illumination, and exactly how illumination is to be
achieved, remain frustratingly obscure. Lepore and Ludwig (2005) sum-
marize the idea more tidily than most, emphasizing the illumination of the
concept of meaning. In doing so, they tidy up Davidson’s presentation; he
sometimes speaks of illumination of the concept of meaning, sometimes of
the illumination of meaning, seemingly drawing no distinction between
the two.
9 Dummett could not have had Davidson in mind when he ﬁrst pub-
lished this passage, but nevertheless this argument inspires all other argu-
ments for Immiscibility.
10 Patterson (2005) argues that Dummett’s argument does not show even
this much. However, Patterson takes it that Dummett means to show
Incompatibility, whereas I assume that he means to show Immiscibility
but not Incompatibility.
11 For Dummett (2002), disquotationalists fall in the category of s-level
theorists, minimalists and weak deﬂationists such as McGrath (1997) fall
in the category of p-level theorists. S-level theorists take the predicate ‘is
true’ to apply to linguistic items (sentences or statements), p-level theorists
take the predicate ‘is true’ to apply to propositions. I use the more famil-
iar terminology in my exegesis, even though this does a mild injustice to
Dummett’s categories. See Dummett pp. 249--250.
12 All the versions of deﬂationism in question are committed to the prin-
ciple of semantic shift -- a principle allowing semantic ascent and descent
between used declarative sentences on the one hand and truth ascriptions
to mentioned sentences or propositions on the other. Instances include,
for example, ‘The statement ‘‘Snow is white’’ is true if and only if snow is
white’ and ‘The proposition that snow is white is true if and only if snow
is white’. In Dummett’s terminology, minimalism is any theory holding
the theses ‘‘(1) that every instance -- or almost every instance -- of the
principle of semantic shift, either as applied to statements or as applied to
propositions, holds good; and (2) that by stipulating that all those in-
stances hold good, we give the whole explanation of the meaning of the
word ‘true’.’’ (Dummett, 2003, p. 22) In this paper, I use the term ‘mini-
malism’ with the restricted sense stipulated in section 2.
13 The 1999 argument (pp. 276--277) closely follows the pattern of the
1959 argument. Dummett (2002) tells us that the disquotational notion of
truth ‘‘cannot serve to explain the meanings possessed by sentences of the
language such as ‘Venus has no satellites’’’ because disquotational truth
‘‘presupposes a prior grasp of their meanings’’ (2002, p. 256), and that the
minimalist theory takes ‘‘the propositions to which truth is to be ascribed,
or of which it is to be denied, as given’’ (2002, p. 252). He emphasizes
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that by the latter he does not mean that a minimalist theory ‘‘presupposes
a philosophical account or defence of the general notion of propositions:
it presupposes only that we can know what proposition is expressed by a
given utterance’’ (2002, p. 252). Dummett (2003) tells us ‘‘the [deﬂationist]
takes as given the meanings of English statements’’ (2003, p. 24).
14 Both Dummett’s and Gupta’s Chicken-and-Egg arguments leave im-
plicit the contrast with substantivism. The contrast would have to made
explicit to show that the combination of deﬂationism and the truth-condi-
tional theory of meaning has a distinctive ﬂaw, i.e., a ﬂaw not shared by
the combination of substantivism and the truth-conditional theory of
meaning.
15 This position comes under attack from more empirically-minded phi-
losophers. For discussion see, among others, Antony (1997) and Rumﬁtt
(2001).
16 It is the muddling of sentence meanings and meaning, rather than of
‘true’ and truth, that makes the argument a mongrel Chicken-and-Egg; on
at least some deﬂationary views, an understanding of ‘true’ constitutes an
understanding of truth, so Gupta’s slide between understanding ‘true’ and
understanding truth is acceptable.
17 The shortest bridge between the proﬀered premises and the proposed
conclusion that I have found involves four additional premises, two of
them extremely diﬃcult to defend. Cf. note 16.
18 Brandom continues: ‘‘For they evidently take for granted the mean-
ings of the sentences that are the results of disquotation’’ (2002, p. 117).
We are now in a position to see, though, that this is an Interpretive
Chicken-and-Egg premise, unsuitable for establishing an Explanatory
Chicken-and-Egg conclusion.
19 We should not take literally Dummett’s occasional mention in
Explanatory Chicken-and-Eggs of truth being prior to meaning, or mean-
ing being prior to truth. As his premises make clear, what he means is
that the notion of truth is prior to the notion of meaning, or the notion
of meaning prior to the notion of truth.
20 Where scientiﬁc, as opposed to philosophical, explanations are con-
cerned, a desire for an explanation in terms of the most basic objects or
properties might lead us to demand that the objects or properties that are
invoked in the explanans be more fundamental than those that are to be
explained. Then a variant of the Priority Assumption would apply to sci-
entiﬁc explanations: if A is more fundamental than B, we cannot use B to
give an explanation of A. But there is no reason to suppose that A’s being
more fundamental than B will guarantee that the notion of A is more ba-
sic than the notion of B.
21 See Avramides (1989), pp. 19--26
22 Widely, but not universally, held; but if reductive analyses may be
circular, then so much the better for my position. For discussion see
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Johnston (1989), particularly pp. 147--148, Blackburn (1993), David
(1993), Belnap (1993), Yablo (1993), Orilia (2000) and King (2000).
23 For a tidy summary, see Humberstone (1997, p. 251).
24 Davidson (1990) emphasizes that his account of meaning is reciprocal,
not reductive (see pp. 314--315); Davidson (1996) emphasizes that his ac-
count of truth is reciprocal, not reductive (see p. 278).
25 It might be desirable if the theory could explain the illuminated con-
cepts to someone who had no grasp of them; but the fact that it cannot
does not vitiate the theory’s explanatory function.
26 The principle seems obvious to us because it has become well-en-
trenched since Frege ﬁrst commented on the connection between truth
and meaning, not because it is trivial.
27 See in addition Johnston (1989) and Holton (1991).
28 See also Gupta and Belnap (1993) and Yablo (1993) on circular deﬁ-
nitions.
29 Thanks to Jon Kvanvig, Peter Markie, Matthew McGrath, Andrew
Melnyk, an audience at the University of Minnesota Twin Cities and
anonymous referees for discussion and/or comments. This paper super-
sedes earlier papers on the same topic; thanks to Louise Antony, Dorit
Bar-On, Simon Blackburn, Hartry Field, Bill Lycan, and Keith Simmons
for comments on those papers, and also to audiences at the American
Philosophical Association, the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society
and the Mind Association, the North and South Carolina Philosophical
Societies, the University of Missouri at Columbia and at St. Louis, Union
College, and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. My argu-
ment has been shaped by a broader literature on circularity, particularly
Humberstone (1997). Work on the paper was completed with a grant
from the University of Missouri Research Board.
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